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Abstract
A concern was voiced in commentaries after the PSPP judgment that the BVerfG’s position regarding the
refusal to apply in Germany the CJEU judgment as issued on an ultra vires basis might be used in EU
Member States infringing the rule of law, and the independence of the judiciary in particular. This issue
is presented in relation to Poland. The article sets out the constitutional provisions which proclaim open-
ness to European integration, as well as the union-friendly case-law of the Constitutional Tribunal (CT)
until 2016. The CT jurisprudence at that time provided, however, for the possibility of refusing to apply EU
law in exceptional situations, even though this never happened. Next, the article discusses endeavors of the
new Polish authorities since the end of 2015 which drastically breach the rule of law in the field of the
judiciary, as well as the measures taken by EU institutions to counteract these adverse phenomena.
The Polish authorities argue that the competence to define the legal position of the judiciary has not been
conferred on the Union and remains within the exclusive competence of the Member States. Such a stance
was also taken by the politically dependent CT in April 2020. The PSPP judgment was therefore welcomed
with joy by Polish politicians. There are major differences, however, between the rulings of the BVerfG and
those of the Polish CT in its current composition, and the hopes pinned on the PSPP judgment by the
Polish authorities are unfounded.
A. Introduction
The judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht—BVerfG)
of May 5, 2020 in the Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP)1 case will probably be regarded as
one of the most important rulings of this court, alongside the judgments on the Maastricht2 or
Lisbon Treaties.3 A huge number of commentaries were written about it during the first weeks
after its publication, so far mainly on the Internet, and many interviews have been given in various
media. The following will not discuss the content of the PSPP judgment. Instead, the consider-
ations below are inspired by remarks which noted the satisfaction with which the authorities in
Poland immediately received the BVerfG judgment in the PSPP case.4 This is visually illustrated
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1Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 859/15 (May 5, 2020), http://www.
bverfg.de/e/rs20200505_2bvr085915en.html [hereinafter Judgement of May 05, 2020].
2Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1993, 89 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 155 [hereinafter Maastricht Judgement].
3Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 30, 2009, 123 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 267.
4M. Avbelj, The Right Question about the FCC Ultra Vires Decision,VERFASSUNGSBLOG (May 6, 2020), https://verfassungsblog.
de/the-right-question-about-the-fcc-ultra-vires-decision/; R. D. Kelemen, P. Eeckhout, F. Fabbrini, L. Pech, & R. Uitz, National
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doi:10.1017/glj.2020.53
by the title of one blog post: “In Poland the champagne corks are popping.”5 The German con-
stitutional court was criticized for failing to take into account the wider, negative effects of its
judgment, although it was aware of them. The harsh wording of the judgment was taken note
of. What is meant here is, e.g. an assessment of the interpretation of the Treaties in the judgment
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as “simply not comprehensible and thus
objectively arbitrary”, not to mention the very assertions of acting “ultra vires.” It was pointed out
that this phrase could be picked up and used in autocratic countries, especially Poland and
Hungary, invoking the authority of a respected constitutional court to challenge obligations under
EU law and negating the final character of CJEU judgments. There would be no grounds for deny-
ing the courts in other Member States the right to do what the German court was allowed to do.
Shortly after the judgment in the PSPP case, Andreas Voßkuhle gave an interview to the weekly
magazine Die Zeit, which included a reference to Poland.6 The journalist’s truculent statement:
“And Poland is almost celebrating that the Federal Constitutional Court has confirmed the
primacy of national law over European law”, was answered firmly by the BVerfG President:
“Poles do what they do, regardless of what we do. : : : And once again: do we really want to
be guided by how Polish or other politicians might possibly react to a decision? Is that to be
the benchmark for a constitutional court?” To that, Andreas Voßkuhle added his interpretation
of the recent judgment: “Our Judgment just says that the CJEU should control more and more
intensively; this does not seem to me to be in line with the position of the Polish government.”
The abovementioned statements lead to considering what the significance for Poland may be of
the view expressed in the PSPP judgment that some CJEU rulings may not apply in Germany as a
Member State, as issued on an ultra vires basis. Of course, the impact can only be indirect7. It is
worth analyzing this issue taking into account the attitude of the current Polish authorities
towards EU institutions in relation to the allegations of violation of the rule of law by Poland.
It is indispensable, however, to start by setting the further considerations in a broader constitu-
tional framework and the jurisprudence of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (CT). This will show
the deeper context of the problem in question, even if it goes unnoticed in the current debate.
B. Constitutional Basis of Poland’s Membership in the EU8
The Constitution of the Republic of Poland9 was passed in 1997, seven years before accession to
the EU. It does not provide specific rules applicable to the process of European integration or the
position of European Union law. Instead, the provisions applicable to international organizations,
Courts Cannot Override CJEU Judgments: A Joint Statement in Defense of the EU Legal Order, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (May 26, 2020),
https://verfassungsblog.de/national-courts-cannot-override-cjeu-judgments/; M. Maduro, Some Preliminary Remarks on the
PSPP Decision of the German Constitutional Court, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (May 6, 2020), https://verfassungsblog.de/some-
preliminary-remarks-on-the-pspp-decision-of-the-german-constitutional-court/; F.C. Mayer, Auf dem Weg zum
Richterfaustrecht?: Zum PSPP-Urteil des BVerfG, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (May 7, 2020), https://verfassungsblog.de/auf-dem-weg-
zum-richterfaustrecht/; P. Meier-Beck, Ultra vires?, D’KART (May 11, 2020), https://www.d-kart.de/blog/2020/05/11/ultra-
vires/.
5Mayer, supra note 4 (translated by the author).
6Andreas Voßkuhle, “Erfolg ist eher kalt”, ZEIT ONLINE (May 13, 2020) (translated by the author).
7An analysis of the case law until 2011 has shown that the BVerfG case law was certainly most frequently referred to even
though sometimes “decoratively” in the statements of grounds for judgments of the Polish CT amongst European constitu-
tional courts: In 39 judgments, whilst other constitutional courts (Austrian, Hungarian, and the French Conseil
Constitutionnel) 3 times each only, and other courts even less frequently or not at all. More recent analyses have not been
performed.
8See Stanisław Biernat, Offene Staatlichkeit: Polen, in HANDBUCH IUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM, BAND II: OFFENE
STAATLICHKEIT—WISSENSCHAFT VOM VERFASSUNGSRECHT 243 (A. von Bogdandy, P. Cruz Villalón, & P. M. Huber eds.,
2007).
9See CONST. OF THE REPUB. OF POLAND (English translation), https://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm.
The translation of certain provisions of the Constitution into English in this paper is slightly different.
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international agreements, and international law also determine the constitutional position of the
EU and EU law.
The starting point is Article 9 of the Constitution proclaiming Poland’s favorability to
international law: “The Republic of Poland shall respect international law binding upon it.”
The political basis for Poland’s accession to the Union is Article 90 paragraph 1, called the
“European Clause”, although its potential scope is wider: “The Republic of Poland may on the
basis of an international agreement delegate to an international organization or international
institution the competences of organs of the state authority in certain matters.” In turn, the place
of international law and thus EU law is determined by Article 91 of the Constitution:
1. A ratified international agreement, upon its publication in Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej
Polskiej [Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland], shall constitute part of the national
legal order, and shall be applied directly, unless its application depends on the enactment
of a statute.
2. An international agreement that has been ratified upon prior consent granted in a statute
shall have precedence over a statute, if the statute in question cannot be reconciled with the
agreement.
3. If an agreement, ratified by the Republic of Poland, establishing an international organiza-
tion so provides, the law established by such organization shall be applied directly, and have
precedence in the event of a collision with statutes.
It should be noted that the above provision proclaims the primacy of the EU Treaties (Article 91
paragraph 2) and secondary law (Article 91 paragraph 3) over statutes. However, Article 8 paragraph
1 of the Constitution remains unaffected: “The Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Republic
of Poland.” International agreements, including EU Treaties, can be both the object and the bench-
mark of control exercised by the CT (Article 188 points 1-3 of the Constitution).
C. Relevant Case Law of the Constitutional Tribunal (CT)
The provisions of the Constitution need to be supplemented in the context discussed here by quot-
ing excerpts from the judgments of the CT which interpret the scope of Poland’s binding obli-
gations under EU law. It is noteworthy, however, that two periods can be distinguished in the
activity of the Polish CT, which was established in 1985: until 201610 and since 2017 until the
present. During the first period, the Tribunal was an independent constitutional court enjoying
prestige in Poland and abroad. The situation has changed since 2017. The Tribunal has since then
been chaired by a person appointed for this position—in the opinion of an overwhelming majority
of lawyers—in violation of the Constitution and the statutes. The legitimacy of some of the new
judges is being denied in the legal community as they have been elected to the seats already occu-
pied by judges from whom the President refused to take the oath in 2015. The composition of the
adjudicating panels for cases of political importance is determined or changed by the new
President of the Tribunal in violation of the existing legislation.
The following judgments were issued by the “old” CT.11
Most important is the judgment of 2005.12 The CT ruled in it that the provisions of the Treaty
of Accession and many of the contested provisions of the TEU and TEC are constitutional.
10In 2016, the Constitutional Tribunal was ignored by the parliament and the government and its rulings were not pub-
lished which was a manifest violation of the Constitution.
11See SELECTED RULINGS OF THE POLISH CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL CONCERNING THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
(2003-2014) (2014), https://trybunal.gov.pl/uploads/media/SiM_LI_EN_calosc.pdf. The three judgments presented below are
available there.
12Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Judgement of May 11, 2005, Ref. No. K 18/04.
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Moreover, the CT formulated many statements concerning the role of Community (EU) law in the
Polish legal order. In the context of these considerations, the interpretation of, inter alia, Article 90
paragraph 1) of the Constitution concerning the delegation of powers of state organs only “in
certain matters” deserves attention. This implies a prohibition on the delegation of all competen-
ces of state authority or those determining in substantial scope their activities or concerning the
entirety of the matters within a certain field. The provision in question does not authorize the
delegation of competences to such an extent that it would signify the inability of the Republic
of Poland to continue functioning as a sovereign and democratic state. In no event may it lead
to results contradicting the explicit wording of constitutional norms or being irreconcilable with
the minimum guarantee functions realized by the Constitution. In particular, the norms of the
Constitution within the field of individual rights and freedoms indicate a minimum and unsur-
passable threshold which may not be lowered or questioned as a result of the introduction of
Community provisions.
The Tribunal emphasized that the accession of Poland to the European Union did not under-
mine the supremacy of the Constitution over the whole legal order. In the event of an inconsis-
tency between a constitutional norm and that of the Community which cannot be eliminated/
reconciled by an interpretation based on relative autonomy of European and national law, the
nation as the sovereign, or a body of state authority empowered by the Constitution to represent
the nation, would need to take a decision choosing between three options. These are: amending
the Constitution; causing modifications within Community provisions; or, ultimately, decide on
Poland’s withdrawal from the European Union.
Of particular relevance is in this context another statement formulated in the judgment obiter
dicta: The Member States maintain the right to assess whether or not, in issuing particular legal
provisions, the Community (Union) legislative authorities acted within the conferred competen-
ces and in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Should the adoption
of provisions infringe these frameworks, the principle of primacy of Community law fails to apply
with respect to such provisions. The cited wording means a reference to the concept of EU insti-
tutions acting ultra vires, without using this terminology though. This idea was only mentioned
and not developed in the judgment under discussion. It was not upheld in the later case law of the
“old” CT until 2016.
In another major judgment, rendered in 2010, the CT ruled on the constitutionality of the
Lisbon Treaty.13 It developed the CT’s position concerning Article 90 paragraph 1 of the
Constitution in the context of the principles of sovereignty, supremacy of the Constitution,
and constitutional identity. However, the specific aspects of the limits of the delegation of com-
petences to the EU and the consequences of crossing those limits were not analyzed.
The next judgment of the CT of 2011 deserves closer inspection.14 In this ruling, the CT directly
reviewed the conformity of EU secondary legislation with the Constitution for the first and the last
time to date. The proceedings in this case were initiated as a result of a constitutional complaint
from a Polish citizen who asserted that the provisions of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of
22.12.2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and com-
mercial matters, known as Brussels I, are incompatible with Article 45 of the Constitution granting
individuals the right to court, and Article 32 which guarantees equality before the law. The com-
plainant alleged that her subjective rights were infringed because she was excluded from proceed-
ings before the Polish court of first instance, in a case regarding the enforceability of a foreign
judgment. Having examined the case, the CT ruled that the contested provisions of the
Council Regulation were consistent with the Constitution.
The judgment aroused controversy amongst lawyers. The subject of criticism was the submis-
sion of an act of EU law to be reviewed for its constitutionality. The Constitutional Tribunal
13Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment of Nov. 24, 2010, Ref. No. K 32/09.
14Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment of Nov. 16, 2011, Ref. No. SK 45/09.
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justified the admissibility of the control by the specificity of the review following a particular pro-
cedure of individual constitutional complaint. Pursuant to Article 79 paragraph 1 of the
Constitution, a constitutional complaint may be submitted to the Tribunal by everybody to check
“the conformity to the Constitution of a statute or another normative act”, upon which basis a
court or a public administration authority has made a final decision on a complainant’s freedoms
or rights or on his/her obligations specified in the Constitution.15
Having analyzed the characteristics of the EU regulations pursuant to Article 288 of the TFEU,
the CT concluded that these very acts of EU secondary legislation may be a direct source of indi-
vidual freedoms or rights and hence they bear the features of ‘another normative act’ within the
meaning of Article 79 paragraph 1 of the Constitution. The point was the allegation that the norms
of EU regulations infringe the constitutional rights and freedoms of the individual.
The CT emphasized that the Republic of Poland accepted the division of competences with
regard to the review of legal acts. That division results in the jurisdiction of the Court of
Justice to provide the final interpretation of EU law as well as to have an exclusive power to deter-
mine the conformity of the EU secondary legislation with the Treaties. In such a context, the CT
referred to the extraordinary and subsidiary character of the jurisdiction of the CT to examine the
conformity of EU law with the Constitution. Undoubtedly, a ruling declaring the non-conformity
should have the character of ultima ratio and occur only when all other ways of resolving a conflict
between Polish norms and the norms of the EU legal order have failed. The CT admitted that such
a consequence of the CJ ruling would be difficult to reconcile with the obligations of a Member
State and the principle of sincere cooperation (Article 4 paragraph 3 of the TEU). The said sit-
uation could even lead to an action brought against Poland before the CJEU for infringement of
obligations under the Treaties (Articles 258-260 of the TFEU). Therefore, before adjudicating on
the non-conformity of an act of EU secondary legislation with the Constitution, the CT should
ascertain the content of the norms of EU secondary legislation which are subject to review. This
may be achieved by referring questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling, pursuant to Article
267 of the TFEU.
The CT noticed similarities in this point to the approach taken by the Bundesverfassungsgericht
(BVerfG) in the order of 2010 in the Honeywell case.16 However, there was a difference; namely, in
the latter case the subject of the review was not an act of EU secondary legislation, but a judgment of
the CJEU, and the allegation of non-conformity with the German Grundgesetz did not concern
fundamental rights, but the issue of going beyond the scope of the competences conferred upon
the EU (ultra vires action). The CT noticed, however, similarities between the case it examined
and other judgments of the BVerfG, namely the order of 1986 in the Solange II case17 and the order
of 2000 in the Banana Market case.18
Concluding its deliberations, the CT defined the approach to similar issues in the future.
Namely, in the case of filing a constitutional complaint which challenges the conformity of
EU regulations with the Constitution, the complainant should be required to make probable that
the challenged act of EU secondary legislation causes a considerable decline in the standard of
protection of rights and freedoms, in comparison with the standard of protection guaranteed
by the Constitution.
To summarize, several characteristics of the CT approach can be identified. Firstly, it stresses
the supremacy of the Polish Constitution also in time of EU membership. Secondly, much atten-
tion is paid to the interpretation of the notion of delegation to an international organization of
15I am probably not fully objective having been the judge rapporteur in this case in the CT.
16Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 6, 2010, 126 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 286.
17Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 22, 1986, 73 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 339 [hereinafter Solange II].
18Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 1/97 (June 7, 2000), http://www.
bverfg.de/e/ls20000607_2bvl000197en.html.
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“the competences of organs of the state authority in certain matters.” Thirdly, it expresses loyalty
and recognizes the role of the CJEU as the final adjudicating authority on the interpretation and
validity of EU law. Fourthly, it deems the principles of conferral of the competences and primacy
of EU law not to be unlimited. In one of its judgments, the CTmentioned the concept of ultra vires
acts, although it did not refer to it in the ratio of its decision. It allowed however for the consti-
tutionality of EU regulations to be examined when considering constitutional complaints. It con-
sidered this to be a very exceptional solution, subsidiary to the competence of the CJEU and
admissible upon the fulfilment of strict requirements. In the period of almost 10 years since
the judgment, in which such a procedure was applied, there was no further attempt to undermine
the constitutionality of acts of EU law on the grounds of lowering the level of protection of fun-
damental rights.
D. Breaching the Rule of Law in Poland
The presidential and parliamentary elections in Poland in 2015 marked the beginning of a process
of violating the Constitution as well as destroying the foundations of democracy and the rule of
law by the legislature and executive.19 It covered various areas of political and social life. Below,
destructive changes in one of these important areas will be synthetically presented: in the admin-
istration of justice.
The first to lose its independence was the Constitutional Tribunal (CT). This allowed the par-
liamentary majority to pass statutes without fear of being subjected to effective scrutiny of their
constitutionality. In 2016, the Prosecutor’s Office was fully subordinated to the Minister of Justice.
Between 2017 and 2020, a number of statutes were issued to limit the independence of the
Supreme Court (SC) and ordinary courts. Two new chambers were created in the SC, consisting
of judges appointed in a procedure that ensures greater influence by politicians.
In 2017, a statute was passed to change the composition of the National Council of the Judiciary
(NCJ).20 It is a constitutional body of great importance, whose main task is to make proposals to
the President concerning candidates for judicial posts. The NCJ consists in its majority of judges.
However, the way of appointing judges—members of the NCJ—was changed. While they were
earlier elected by the General Assemblies of judges, according to the new law they are appointed by
the Sejm (Parliament). The Act on the NCJ in its current form is considered unconstitutional by
most legal circles and the legitimacy of judges appointed on the motion of the new Council is
questioned.
The “reforms” carried out in the judiciary consisted mainly of staff exchanges. This became
most apparent in the case of the SC judges. The new law lowered the judges’ retirement age, which
was expected to result in in the termination of the holding of office by more than one third of
judges. In ordinary courts there was an exchange of presidents and vice-presidents by the
Minister of Justice. In addition, the replacements of judges were the result of a new way of
appointing and promoting them on the motion of the politicized NCJ.
The Polish authorities argued that the statutory changes to the administration of justice are
compatible with the Constitution. This claim cannot be reliably verified in the light of the
CT’s subordination to political influence.
19See, e.g., W. SADURSKI, POLAND’S CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN (2019); M. Matczak, 10 Facts on Poland for the
Consideration of the European Court of Justice, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (May 13, 2018), https://verfassungsblog.de/10-facts-on-
poland-for-the-consideration-of-the-european-court-of-justice/; L. Pech & P. Wachowiec, 1460 Days Later: Rule of Law in
Poland R.I.P. (Part I), VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Jan. 13, 2020), https://verfassungsblog.de/1460-days-later-rule-of-law-in-
poland-r-i-p-part-i/; L. Pech & P. Wachowiec, 1460 Days Later: Rule of Law in Poland R.I.P. (Part II), VERFASSUNGSBLOG
(Jan. 15, 2020), https://verfassungsblog.de/1460-days-later-rule-of-law-in-poland-r-i-p-part-ii/.
20M. Matczak, The Rule of Law in Poland: A Sorry Spectacle, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Mar. 3, 2018), https://verfassungsblog.de/
the-rule-of-law-in-poland-a-sorry-spectacle/; Sadurski, supra note 19, at 99.
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E. Reaction of EU Institutions to Violations of the Rule of Law in Poland
The amendments to the statutes and the manner of their application, as presented, triggered a
reaction from EU institutions concerned about Poland’s violation of the rule of law, especially
in the field of the judiciary. In 2016-2017, the Commission launched for Poland a new EU rule
of law framework21 which failed, though. Therefore, in December 2017 the Commission decided
to make a reasoned proposal to the Council to initiate proceedings against Poland under Article 7
TEU. The proceedings have been ongoing for more than two years, but there is no sign of the
willingness of Member States to conclude them.
In this state of affairs, the CJEU became the leading institution, alongside the Commission, in
the efforts to restore the rule of law in the troublesome Member State. This was undoubtedly due
to the new line of jurisprudence launched in early 2018 by the landmark judgment on Portuguese
judges.22 Since 2018, the Commission has filed complaints against Poland under Article 258
TFEU. To date, the CJEU has given two judgments following this procedure: In June 2019, it ruled
on the incompatibility of the provisions lowering the retirement age for judges of the SC with
EU law.23 In November 2019, it ruled that the legislation introducing a different retirement
age for women and men in the positions of judges of ordinary courts is incompatible with
EU law.24
Currently, proceedings are pending before the CJEU in the third case filed by the
Commission.25 It concerns the model of disciplinary responsibility for judges which undermines
judicial independence. In April 2020, the CJEU issued an order in which prescribed interim
measures. They consisted in temporary suspension of judicial activities of the Disciplinary
Chamber of the SC until the final judgment is delivered.26
In April 2020, the Commission addressed to Poland a letter of formal notice in the fourth case.
The Commission requests Poland to put an end to the violation of EU law by the provisions of
so-called “muzzle law” on the judiciary issued in early 2020.27 The statute provides, inter alia, for
disciplinary proceedings against judges for applying EU law and judgments of the CJEU and for
making preliminary references.
In addition, there are several proceedings under way following questions referred by Polish
courts for preliminary rulings.28 These concern various aspects of the legal position of judges
in the context of the requirements of their independence under EU law, as well as the status
of persons appointed to judicial posts as a result of procedures which raise doubts as to their
fairness.
21Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on a New EU Framework to Strengthen
the Rule of Law, COM (2014) 158 final, https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2014/EN/1-2014-158-EN-F1-1.Pdf.
22ECJ, Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117 (Feb. 27, 2018), https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62016CJ0064.
23ECJ, Case C-619/18, Eur. Comm. v. Republic of Poland, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531 (June 24, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/liste.jsf?num=C-619/18.
24ECJ, Case C-192/18, European Commission v. Republic of Poland, ECLI:EU:C:2019:924 (Nov. 5, 2019), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-192/18.
25ECJ, Pending Case C-791/19 (Oct. 25, 2019).
26Ordonnance de la Cour, Case C-791/19 R (Apr. 8, 2020). Translation into English is not available.
27See L. Pech, W. Sadurski, K.L. Scheppele, Open Letter to the President of the European Commission regarding Poland’s
“Muzzle Law”, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Mar. 9, 2020), https://verfassungsblog.de/open-letter-to-the-president-of-the-european-
commission-regarding-polands-muzzle-law/.
28See ECJ, Pending Case C-824/18, A.B.; ECJ, Pending Case C-487/19, W. Ż.; ECJ, Pending Case C-508/19, Prokurator
Generalny; ECJ, Pending Case C- 748/19, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim; ECJ, Pending Case C-749/19,
Prokuratura Rejonowa Warszawa-Żoliborz w Warszawie; ECJ, Pending Case C-750/19, Prokuratura Rejonowa Warszawa
—Wola w Warszawie; ECJ, Pending Case C-751/19, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Pruszkowie; ECJ, Pending Case
C-752/19, Prokuratura Rejonowa Warszawa—Ursynów w Warszawie; ECJ, Pending Case C-753/ 19, Prokuratura
Rejonowa Warszawa—Wola w Warszawie; ECJ, Pending Case C-754/19, Prokuratura Rejonowa Warszawa—Wola w
Warszawie; ECJ, Pending Case C-55/20, Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości.
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The recent judgment of the CJEU of November 2019 deserves special attention. Its contents
and far-reaching consequences will be presented below.29
F. Reactions of the Polish Authorities to the Activities of EU Institutions
The answer of the Polish authorities to the interest of the EU institutions in the situation in Poland
has been constant over the last five years. Politicians have emphasized that all undertakings are in
accordance with the Constitution and serve to improve the functioning of the judiciary. In addi-
tion, which is of particular importance here, whenever EU institutions requested information on
changes in the field of the judiciary in Poland, and then took steps to stop violations of the rule of
law, the Polish authorities consistently responded by raising the argument that the organization
and functioning of justice is an internal matter for a Member State. Claims were made that this
area falls outside the competence of the Union because the requisite competences were not con-
ferred by the Member States in the Treaties. Interventions by the Union institutions in defense of
the independence of the courts and judges were and are therefore considered by the Polish author-
ities to be devoid of Treaty grounds and therefore inadmissible. Added to this was a belief that the
transformations taking place in the Polish judiciary are consistent with EU values and similar
solutions found in other countries. The argument of taking action by EU institutions outside their
competence was raised by Poland on various occasions: in responses to letters of formal notice,
responses to reasoned opinions and to actions in individual cases under Article 258 TFEU, as well
as in government positions in preliminary ruling proceedings.
In support of the thesis of a purely internal nature of the States’ competence in the field of the
judicial system, the Polish authorities refer to the case law of the CJEU. However, they do so in a
selective and thus distorted manner. A characteristic example is the frequent quotation by pol-
iticians in the official documents and in the media of the phrase that “the organization of justice
falls within the competence of the Member States” omitting the full wording of the Court’s state-
ment: ”Furthermore, although, as the Republic of Poland and Hungary point out, the organization
of justice in the Member States falls within the competence of those Member States, the fact
remains that, when exercising that competence, the Member States are required to comply with
their obligations deriving from EU law.”30
Even a rough analysis of EU law leads to the conclusion that the view expressed by the Polish
authorities that the judiciary system and legal proceedings remain within the exclusive compe-
tence of Member States is indefensible. The statements of Polish politicians do not take account
of the new line of jurisprudence of the CJEU initiated by the aforementioned judgment on
Portuguese judges. This position deserves to be commented on and evaluated.
It is obvious that issues such as the structure of the judiciary or the court’s procedure itself
remain within the competence of the Member States. However, EU law includes those aspects
of the organization and functioning of the judiciary that are related to the role of national courts
as European courts applying Union law. This role follows from Article 19 paragraph 1 third sen-
tence TEU, Article 267 TFEU, Articles 81-82 TFUE and Article 47 ChFR. National courts are
therefore required to comply with the standards of EU law. One of the most important require-
ments is the independence and impartiality of courts and judges as part of the rule of law being
one of the values of the Union (Article 2 TEU). Compliance with this requirement is subject to
control by the EU institutions.31
29See infra note 32.
30See European Commission v. Republic of Poland, Case C-619/18 at 52. Identical or similar statements can be found in
other rulings.
31See e.g. ECJ, Case C-216/18 PPU, LM (Celmer), ECLI:EU:C:2018:586 (July 25, 2018), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?
num=C-216/18.
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G. A Recent Bone of Contention in the Relations between Poland and the European
Union
Note has already been made above to the judgment of the CJEU of November 2019.32 It was deliv-
ered in response to several preliminary references from the SC. The essential legal problem in this
case was the assessment under EU law of the procedures for appointing judges in the context of
ensuring their independence. The CJEU formulated in the judgment under consideration detailed
conditions to be met under EU law for the recently established Disciplinary Chamber of the SC in
Poland to be regarded as a “court” for the purpose of EU law and for the NCJ involved in the
procedure for appointing judges to be separated from the legislative and executive powers.
Following the guidelines contained in this judgment of the CJEU, the Polish SC issued several
judgments in its execution in which it concluded that the Disciplinary Chamber of the SC does not
meet the requirements for a “court” under EU and Polish law, and that the NCJ, in the current
legal situation, does not warrant a fair procedure for the presentation of candidates for judges to
the President.33
As many Polish courts still had doubts about the consequences of the CJEU judgment, the SC
adopted a resolution in January 2020 in order to unify the case-law.34 Judges of the SC from three
chambers (out of five), appointed prior to the aforementioned 2017 statutory amendments con-
cerning the NCJ, participated in issuing this resolution. The SC considered the impact on the
exercise of individuals’ right to judicial protection under Article 45 of the Constitution, Article
6 of the ECHR, and Article 47 of the CFR in the light of the fact that the adjudicating courts
are sometimes composed of persons appointed by the President on the motion of the NCJ, fol-
lowing the new procedure. The SC deems the new procedure unconstitutional due to the com-
position of the NCJ, its politicization and lack of independence. The flawed procedure has the
effect of undermining the standard of independence and impartiality of the judges appointed
thereunder. In conclusion, the SC’s resolution stated that judges of the SC appointed under
the new procedure should be removed from adjudication. In turn, judges of ordinary courts in
this category should refrain from adjudicating until it is established whether the flawed process
of their appointment led to a breach of the standard of independence and impartiality in indi-
vidual circumstances.
The SC’s resolution of January 2020 encountered fierce criticism from politicians on the gov-
ernment’s side. The aforementioned “muzzle law” of January 2020 was issued in response, pro-
viding, among other things, for disciplinary responsibility for judges challenging the President’s
appointment under the new procedure.
In addition, the SC resolution in question was challenged in the CT. The politically dependent
Polish constitutional court allowed this resolution to be reviewed even though it did not fall within
its jurisdiction and ruled that the SC’s resolution was unconstitutional.35
In other parallel proceedings, the CT decided on a dispute artificially created by the Speaker of
the Sejm over competence36 between the SC and the Sejm and the President as a result of the
aforementioned resolution of the SC.37 This ruling evaluated not only the CT the SC’s resolution
32ECJ, Joined Cases C-585, 624, & 625/18, A.K. v. Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa, ECLI:EU:C:2019:982 (Nov. 19, 2019).
33Most significant was Supreme Court of Poland, Case No. III PO 7/18, Judgement of Dec. 5, 2019.
34Resolution of the Panels of the Combined Chambers: Civil, Criminal as well as Labor and Social Security of the Supreme
Court of January 23, 2020, SĄD NAJWYŻSZY (Jan. 23, 2020), http://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?
ItemSID=598-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia&rok=2020.
35Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment of Apr. 20, 2020, Ref. No. U 2/20 https://trybunal.gov.pl/en/hearings/
judgments/art/11040-uchwala-skladu-polaczonych-izb-cywilnej-karnej-oraz-pracy-i-ubezpieczen-spolecznych-sadu-
najwyzszego-z-dnia-23-stycznia-2020-r-sygn-akt-bsa-i-4110-120.
36This is a special type of procedure before the CT (Article 189 of the Constitution).
37Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Judgement of Apr. 21, 2020, Ref. No. Kpt 1/20, https://trybunal.gov.pl/en/hearings/
postanowienia/art/11047-spor-kompetencyjny-miedzy-sejmem-rp-a-sadem-najwyzszym-oraz-miedzy-prezydentem-rp-a-
sadem-najwyzszym. Five judges made dissenting opinions which concerned disputable aspects of Polish law.
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but also the CJEU’s judgment of November 2019 which provided an impulse for passing that
resolution. The position of the CT in this case is of particular relevance in the context of these
considerations. The main statements regarding EU aspects of the ruling may be summarized as
follows:38 Both the resolution of the SC of January 2020 and the previous judgment of the CJEU of
November 2019 are contrary to the Polish Constitution. In the light of the Treaties, the CJEU has
no competence in the judicial system of the Member States. The CJEU judgment could not be
treated by the SC as a basis for deciding on matters falling within the exclusive constitutional
competence of Polish state authorities, that is the Sejm and the President of Poland. The SC’s
conviction of the binding character of CJEU judgments in cases which have not been conferred
to the EU by the Treaties is incorrect. Furthermore, judgments of the CJEU are not amongst the
sources of EU law listed in Article 288 TFEU.
Commenting on this judgment, note is to be made of its most striking feature that EU law was
understood by the CT in a highly simplified manner. No attempt was made to interpret the
Treaties in any way, no reference was made to case-law or the legal literature. The ‘judiciary’,
as the field of an exclusive competence of the Member States, was treated as a whole, without
any distinctions made within it or without linking it to the entirety of EU law.
The level of the ruling discussed here demonstrates a considerable fall of the CT compared with
the judgments covered above from before 2016. Ignoring the attainments to date in the area of
interpretation of the Constitution in the context of Poland’s membership in the EU, the constitu-
tional court found the actions of EU institutions in the matters of the national judiciary to have
been taken on ultra vires basis.
The position of the Polish CT is thus radical, more so than the BVerfG judgment in the PSPP
case, and of potentially higher relevance for EU law. Indeed, the subject matter of the Polish ruling,
that is judicial protection, is central for EU law. Significantly, however, the Polish judgment dis-
cussed here has not attracted attention in EU institutions, not even in Poland or amongst com-
mentators. This is probably related to the fact, as already mentioned, that the Polish CT has lost its
prestige in recent years. In the ruling in question, the CT decided in line with the expectations of
the Polish authorities. This is, after all, a feature that has characterized the entire jurisprudence of
the CT since 2017 in cases with sensitive political elements, which meets the wishes of the ones
currently in power.39 In the press interview mentioned above, A. Voßkuhle briefly answered the
question whether a court like the Constitutional Court in Poland is still a partner for BVerfG: “No.
It is no longer a serious court, it is a puppet.” Regrettably, this opinion is to be supported.40
However, the importance of the ruling of the CT presented above cannot be underestimated.
Politicians needed it compellingly to strengthen, with the formal authority of the national con-
stitutional court, the position already presented by the Polish government. They will be able at last
to invoke this judgment both in Poland and externally, especially in contacts with EU institutions.
To date, judgments of the CJEU in cases concerning the judiciary have generally been respected,
even if with a delay and not fully, despite their criticism by the Polish authorities and the ques-
tioning of the competence to issue them. The last ruling of the CT can, however, be used to prove
the superiority of the jurisprudence of national constitutional courts over that of the CJEU.
Currently, after this ruling, the Polish parliament and government will be able to refuse to enforce
acts of EU institutions or judgments of the CJEU on the grounds that they have been rendered
outside the Treaty mandates, as confirmed by the national constitutional court having the last say.
38The discussion of this ruling is based on a press release. Its full statement of reasons was not yet published when this
Article was written, two months after the ruling had been issued.
39See documented analysis in M. PYZIAK-SZAFNICKA, TRYBUNAŁ KONSTYTUCYJNY Ȧ REBOURS 25 (2020). The author is a
former judge of the CT.
40This statement was commented upon by Ms J. Przyłębska, the current President of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal:
“The scandalous statement by the President of the German Constitutional Court does not fit into any canon of fair public
debate. I am embarrassed that a person in such an important position is speaking in such a way.” A few days earlier, Ms
Przyłębska had praised the PSPP judgment.
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H. What the BVerfG Judgment in the PSPP Case May be Useful For
The potential impact of the German BVerfG judgment, which was based on the concept of ultra
vires acts, is evident in the current situation of Poland.
On the same day on which the judgment in the PSPP case was given, two deputy ministers of
justice spoke about it at a press conference.41 One may have doubts, however, whether they had
time at all to read the judgment or even its summary. These politicians stated that the German
ruling has a “colossal relevance” for the dispute between Poland and the Commission about the
judiciary. In their opinion, the German judgment confirms the position of the Polish government
which accuses EU institutions of exceeding the powers conferred upon them. This is the situation
in which the constitutional courts of the Member States step in. In this context, politicians praised
the ruling of the Polish CT issued two weeks earlier. In their view, the BVerfG judgment is a mani-
festation of the defense of German sovereignty, whereas the analogous position of Poland was
criticized by representatives of the Commission. “I wonder if the Commission will comment
on the judgment of the German constitutional court in the same way”, added sarcastically one
of the deputy ministers, not expecting that an action against Germany under Article 258
TFEU would be considered soon afterwards.
The Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki spoke about the ruling of the BVerfG with
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.42 He termed it “one of the most important judgments in the his-
tory of the EU / : : : / This is perhaps the first time that this has been said with such clarity: The
Treaties are created by the Member States and they determine where the limits of competence lie
for the EU institutions.” Similar judgments have been handed down by courts in other European
states, including the Polish CT. The CJEU has “very extensive powers”, but only “in the field aris-
ing out of decisions taken by the States.” Attempts to extend this area were “arbitrary and danger-
ous for the rule of law.” In his opinion, every mature democracy needs a system of separation and
balance of powers. “In the absence of such a system, all violence, including that of the judiciary,
becomes an arbitrary, unlimited, undemocratic power.”Morawiecki expressed his hope at the end
that thanks to the Karlsruhe ruling “a real debate will begin in the EU on how to ensure this
balance and a mechanism for its control at the Union level.”
As it seems, no other European politician of this rank has expressed such a clear approval of the
BVerfG judgment or has placed great hopes in it for the future. Nor has anyone taken it as a
starting point for a general debate on the change in the relations between the EU and the
Member States, or between the CJEU and the national constitutional courts. It is hard to imagine
that another prime minister of a Member State (perhaps with the exception of Hungary) would
speak in such a simplified and generalized way about the competences of the CJEU and their
“arbitrary and dangerous” extension. The comments on the “separation and balance of powers”
are ambiguous: it is not clear whether they refer to the system within particular states or to the
relations between the Member States and the Union. The term “primacy of EU law” is not used in
this statement at all.
It can also be added that Ms. Julia Przyłębska, President of the CT since the end of 2016, praised
BVerfG for confirming that national constitutional courts are the courts having the last word, as
the Polish CT found in April 2020.43
41See Polish Ministry of Justice, The Judgement of the German Constitutional Court Confirms Poland’s Position in the
Dispute with the European Commission, GOV.PL (May 12, 2020), https://www.gov.pl/web/justice/the-judgement-of-the-
german-constitutional-court-confirms-polands-position-in-the-dispute-with-the-european-commission.
42See Thomas Gutschker, Konrad Schuller, & Gerhard Gnauck, EU droht Deutschland mit Verfahren, FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (May 9, 2020), https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/eu-droht-deutschland-mit-vertragsverletzungsver
fahren-16762097.html.




Regardless of how the correctness of the BVerfG judgment in the PSPP case is assessed, its use
as a serious argument in the conflict between Poland and EU institutions is flawed. The common
feature of the BVerfG judgment in the PSPP case and the last ruling of the Polish CT is the lack of
approval for making the CJEU judgments binding in each case. However, important differences
prevail. The German judgment contains a statement of reasons, which should be underlined here,
irrespective of whether these reasons are considered convincing.44 The Polish judgment, on the
other hand, does not contain any substantive explanation for excluding the application of EU law
and the case-law of the CJEU in the whole area of the judiciary of Poland. The BVerfG does not
challenge the competence of the CJEU to rule on the interpretation and validity of EU law.
Reference to the ultra vires concept is reserved to exceptional situations even though determined
otherwise than in earlier case-law.45 The Polish CT in the last judgment discussed here, in contrast
to previous case-law, seems, on the other hand, to treat national constitutional courts as having the
general power to decide when the case-law of the CJEU can be ignored.
It is to be noted at the same time that the reference in Poland to the BVerfG’s jurisprudence is
incomplete. Politicians might not know (and their advisors do not provide the information) that
next to judgments which may be deemed to demonstrate some distance to the EU, the German
constitutional court issues also landmark judgments which are fully based on the Union concept
of fundamental rights and confirm the primacy of EU law.46 Such rulings are not taken note of in
the Member States which infringe the rule of law even though they could be a good point of refer-
ence for them.47
The selective reference by the Polish authorities to the BVerfG jurisprudence in order to
strengthen its reluctant approach to EU law does not stand up in legal terms. Poland’s position
in relations with EU institutions cannot be expected to improve. The experience of recent years
allows a prediction, however, that the German example is likely to be used more extensively in the
future for political and propaganda reasons.
44See Judgement of May 5, 2020 at para. 112.
45See analysis of earlier case-law of the BVerfG on ultra vires, D. Grimm, M. Wendel, & T. Reinbacher, European
Constitutionalism and the German Basic Law, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS IN EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:
DEMOCRACY, RIGHTS, THE RULE OF LAW 423 (A. Albi & S. Bardutzky eds., 2019). See also in the wider union context, M.
Kawczyńska, The Court of Justice of the European Union as a Law-Maker: Enhancing Integration or Acting ultra vires?, in
JUDICIAL LAW-MAKING IN EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 207-210, 219-220 (M. Florczak-Wątor ed., 2020).
46See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BvR 16/13 (Nov 6, 2019), http://www.
bverfg.de/e/rs20191106_1bvr001613.html [Right to be Forgotten I]; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal
Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BvR 276/17 (Nov 6, 2019) http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20191106_1bvr027617.html [Right
to be Forgotten II].
47See Matthias Goldmann, As Darkness Deepens: The Right to be Forgotten in the Context of Authoritarian
Constitutionalism, 21 GERMAN L.J.. 45 (2020).
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